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A Genius for Future War
As the United States Mtlltaty approaches the 21ti Century we have every reason to be proud and confident of our positron in the world. We have had a tremendously s,ccessful ce~ury, twice saving the world for democracy, and generally translabng our nation's policies into reality, whether In war, peace or In between. That IS not to say we have always been victorious, but when we have not we have certainly learned from our mistakes and are a better force for It And, we have every reason to believe we will still be able to carry out our nation's directives In the coming years. Still, nothing ever remains the same and the 21* Century will be no different In that respect. In fact, the impact of three emerging factors of change may be so great as to alter the very nature of war and how nations employ their armed forces. Those three factors are, the expansion of battlespace, the impact of Information, and chaos and complexity In light of the ohanglng nature of war, we must continue to improve our Armed Forces to remain the finest military In the world and to continue to be the most effective possible Instrument of national strategy. llms Improvement must encompass all facets of things mrlltary, ' Including, organlzatlons, operabonal concepts, technologies, readiness and training, our servicemen, and leadership.
Of <he facets listed above, the most Important IS leadership. The best equipment, concerts, and servicemen can never realize their potential without the finest possible eadershlp, what Clausewltz called "a genius for war " In hrs theoretical work, Cn War, CIausewRz developed the nature of war, deriving from that nature the need for genius 17 war and the attributes of that genius As we enter the 21ti Century, we need a 'GenlLs for =uture War " While Clausewltz' attributes of genius In war (Courage, Strength, and Coup D'oeil) remain valid; to build genius for future war we must develop leacers who can excel as the nature of war adapts to the three cntlcal change factors centlfied above. This paper reviews Clausewltz attributes of genius in war in the context of the nature of war. We then examine how the nature of war, and thus the attributes of genius, will change In the early 21St Centurv. Finally, we will suggest how -ddS z'Mz' Genius for War 7-7,.
Cltusew~tz mliltary world was, from our viewpoInt, a relatively simple one of one dlmenslonal, Ilrezr combat fought either on land or sea While he clearly understood the natbre of the full spectrum of conflict from guerrilla operations to total war, hrs focus was on malor armies fighting national wars. Still most of his description of the I nature of war remains valid today. He described that nature to be of two realms; physlca/ and moral ' Any successful approach to the use of armed forces must of course 1 I addresq both realms. The physical realm was that of units, mllrtary maneuver and combat; one of physical exertion, privation, and fear of death. This realm was where I the scle'nce of war was practiced, dealing with those aspects of war that could generally be known and quantified. Additionally, the physical realm was dominated by fnctlon; which he describes as "countless In Clat:sewitz' construct, genius for war requires mastery of both the physical ard the moral realms. That genius has three attributes; courage, strength and coup d'cell. E&n of these attributes In turn has aspects that deal with each realm. Courage, for exadple, thus has two aspects, physical and moral, both absolutely required for genius. Physical courage IS exactly that, courage In the face of battle, death and destruction; overcoming physical fear to lead soldlers. Moral courage IS the courage to accept t;7e responslblllty for leadership. Clausewltz believed that physical courage was an attribute that, once attained, would last for a lIfetime. In contrast, due to its psycholc'glcal nature, courage to accept responslbllrty was susceptible to erosion and must be constantly renewed. The highest genius combined the two types of courage, enabling' the leader to deal with both realms of war simultaneously.4
The attribute of strength also has physical and moral aspects. The physical aspect IS "strength of will " Strength of will enables the commander to continue the military operation despite the death, destruction and suffering that hrs decrslons cause Observlr/g the horrors his orders cause will wear down and break leaders who can not d-aw u$on strercth of will to carry them through to success In contrast, the moral aspect IS "sz-ength of character " Strength of character IS that which enables the genius to keep his focus and decision-making ability during times of exceptional stress and viole?r e-notion Thus, strength of character consists not solely In having powerful feellrgs,, but In marntarnrng one's balance In spite of them. ' 1 Coup d'oetl IS probably the toughest of the atributes to comprehend Coup d'oetl IS the ability, in the midst of conflict, to see all the way through the problem presented ard arrive, with only a few moments of thought, at a solution that will lead to success.
It IS the! "gestalt" approach to military operations, seeing the entire campaign or battle as a unified whole, comprehending all of the drffrcultres and yet understandrng how to chart a tourse to victory. To Clausewltz, war IS an endeavor where time and space are compressed, so the true genius IS able to accomplish this feat virtually instantly and without the benefit of staff processes and long study In modern terms, we call the ' We are drawn to military theories that play to our strengths We avidly seek theories that tell us If we can overmatch our opponent In manufactunng the tools of war, synchronize corntat power to mass overwhelming fire on an enemy or strike precisely the right target at the right time; we are sure to win. We base our doctnne on Jomini, Mahan and Mitchell vice Clausewitz, Corbett and Mao However, complexity and chaos force us to deal with both the linear and complex world. We are forced to accept that complex systems tend toward chaos and Increase, rather than decrease, friction in war. And, much as we are drawn to the promise of near perfect battlespace knowledge through information operations, we must understand that information itself breeds uncertar'nty, so that there will always be fog In war. As Clausewltz states, "we now know more, but this makes us more, not less uncertain " The success with which we develop genius to dominate others at the edge of chaos IS the third key to the 21' Century. vulnerable to the forces of equlllbnum and chaos. This genius can only be developed by t-aming future leaders throughout their careers to think "out of the box" so that becomes not the exception, but the rule. Tactical problems should be fought out using conventional operations, then reset and fought again using asymmetrical operations, then reset and executed a third time using combinations of the two. This methodology should be applied across the entire spectrum of conflict, resulting in true genius who can master the complex and chaotic world of 21st Century military operations Besides an expanded coup d'oell, srgnlflcant strength of will and character will be required to persevere rn the fog and uncertainty of future information warfare and complex operations. The increased lethality and destruction of future Information-based war WI/I place great strains on the strength of will of our leaders, and may cause the people,and government to alter their will as they too are drawn Into the horror of war Witnes's for example the impact of the Highway of Death, north of Kuwait City in the Gulf War Not only was the horror evident to the soldiers and leaders on the Immediate battlefield, video carried the images directly to the CINC and the President. Whereas Schwarzkopf was Immediately aware of the result of his orders, 50 years earlier Etsenl-ower would have been spared the sight of equivalent destruction for weeks or month-s And, while InformatIon technologies WIII streamline precision application of force, the result of the Information Age will likely be to cause more, rather than less, uncertainty at operabonal and strategic levels. So much information will be available 2nd ceceptlon options so varied, that the future genius will be forced to make dec sors with far less certamty than Napoleon had in any of his battles. The Increased tempo bf operations, both mrlltanly and polltlcally will further increase the stress on senior leaders, thus further attacking their strength of character. Development of strength of wrll and character will be a significant challenge The generation of leaders entecing service today will develop as true products of the Information Age. So long as their development IS not constrained by older generation leaders and operational concepts, they will doubtless be perfectly at home rn the Information-dominated battlespace The use of simulations and educational programs can replicate much of the stress on senior leaders caused by the Increased tempo, uncertainty, civil-mllltary interactions and complexity of future warfare. What slmulatlons can not do, and really
